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INTRODUCTION 
Meera Sabaratnam 
Department of  Politics and International Studies 
SOAS University of  London 
In an era of  ‘post-truth’ politics, where reports of  ‘fake news’ and ‘alternative facts’ 
dominate the mass media, it is fitting that we should pay more attention to the role of  
fictional narratives in world politics. After all, if  ‘facts’ and ‘news’ of  choice can be 
disseminated with increasing ease by whichever regime is in power, and if  aspects of  the 
‘public sphere’ are cultivated by corporations in ways that deliberately produce manipulative, 
distracting echo chambers, then it seems imperative for all scholars to have a handle on the 
relationship between politics, narration, truth and fiction.  
We are therefore pleased to present an ISQ Online symposium on Daniel and Musgrave’s 
2017 article ‘Synthetic Experiences: How Popular Culture Matters for Images of  
International Relations’. The authors argue in this article that fictional narratives within 
popular culture can have a significant influence on elite and mass audiences through forms 
of  cognitive interaction between fictional narratives and others. The piece explores this 
through the frame of  ‘synthetic experiences’, suggesting that fiction may be frequently 
synthesised into cognition of  particular situations, and thus play similar roles to academic 
knowledge in terms of  helping policymakers interpret situations and courses of  action. This 
is illustrated through an examination of  the effect of  Tom Clancy novels on the Reagan-
Bush era foreign policy establishment.  
The responses to the article, from scholars with expertise on questions of  popular culture 
and foreign policy, open up a series of  critical tensions that emerge from the article. Valerie 
Hudson welcomes the ‘cover’ for Foreign Policy Analysis specialists to engage further with 
fiction, but asks whether such cultural ‘touchstones’ continue to exist, and what it would 
mean for them to ‘influence’ world politics. Jutta Weldes offers a more sceptical reading of  
whether a more positivistic approach to reading popular culture would benefit an already 
heterodox subfield committed to studying Popular Culture in World Politics (PCWP), or 
potentially constrain it. Kathleen Brennan questions the depiction of  ‘IR’ used in the 
article’s argument, and raises the active role of  government actors themselves in shaping 
fictional narratives. David Sylvan interrogates the significance of  ‘engrossment’ as a causal 
mechanism producing specific outcomes, and calls for a wider engagement with culture as a 
set of  practices. Vineet Thakur suggests that fiction has a deeper power than creating 
narratives – that it creates identities and contours of  personhood themselves, which also 
offers a means of  engaging with politics from alternative standpoints. The authors finally 
respond on a wide range of  issues.  
The symposium overall demonstrates that differences of  philosophical and methodological 
commitment are not necessarily resolved by an engagement with common objects of  
inquiry – in this case, popular culture. If  anything, questions of  causation, explanation and 
interpretation are challenged and made more complex in attempting to come to agreement 
over how and where popular culture matters, and what is required to study it.  
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CULTURE AND FOREIGN POLICY 
Valerie M. Hudson 
Department of  International Affairs 
The Bush School of  Government and Public Service 
Texas A&M University 
The field of  Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) has long embraced the proposition that there are 
important cultural influences on foreign policy (see, to give but two examples, Hudson, 
1997; Sampson and Hudson, 1999).  Culture can provide meaning, value preferences, and 
behavioral scripts to the foreign policy decisionmaker.  Culture can make certain foreign 
policy moves more likely, and also entirely preclude others, for foreign policy itself  can be 
analyzed in dramaturgical terms (Shih, 1993; Etheredge, 1992). And the sources of  cultural 
influence are infinite—from prevalent childrearing practices to viral social media memes. 
The potential breadth and depth of  the study of  culture’s influence on foreign policy is 
simultaneously its great promise and its great headache. 
On the one hand, then, it felt a bit odd to read Daniel and Musgrave’s piece, which puts 
forth the proposition that fictional immersive experiences can help shape foreign policy 
choice.  Of course they can, and this is in line with decades of  FPA scholarship probing the 
intersection of  culture and foreign policy. Any story can influence; as social psychologist 
Jonathan Haidt puts it, “The human mind is a story processor, not a logic processor. 
Everyone loves a good story; every culture bathes its children in stories.” (2013: 328).  Even 
science and social science are, in a sense, also but methods of  creating stories-that-explain. 
And every story we allow into our long-term memory is grist for the mill of  metaphor and 
allusion, allowing stories to roam far beyond their original preserve (Khong, 1992). 
What Daniel and Musgrave bring new to the table, I believe, is the idea that FPA should not 
only take historical stories and lived experience into account when studying culture’s effects 
on foreign policy, but popular, fictional stories as well. I thank them; it is useful for scholars 
to be offered “professional cover” for doing so.  For example, I once witnessed a group of  
senior government analysts engage in an impromptu half  hour passionate debate about 
which Marvel superhero was the best symbol of  the contemporary United States (Iron Man 
won the day over Captain America and the Hulk).  But there was no professional means for 
me to report and reflect on what I had heard, though I felt the discussion was noteworthy 
from an FPA standpoint. I hope Daniel and Musgrave’s work opens the door for such 
reflection. 
The trick to establishing such study within the purview of  the social scientific enterprise is, 
of  course, methodological.  Interpretation of  stories is one thing, but demonstrating links to 
attitudes and behavior is another. 
For example, to move from a psychobiographical element (‘Reagan enjoyed Clancy’s 
novels’) to the level of  culture (‘Clancy’s novels influenced the foreign policy of  the Reagan 
administration’), a story must be a cultural touchstone.  That is, those in the culture must be 
able to assume that most others within the culture will know the referent. Without that 
touchstone status, the fictional story will be of  little use in persuading others that a particular 
foreign policy should be pursued.  The allusion will mean nothing to others; the 
metaphorical shorthand for a matrix of  emotions, thoughts, estimates, and interpretations 
will be lost.   
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But the touchstone assumption has been irrevocably altered by the fire hydrant that is media 
today.  While once if  you had said, “No more Vietnams,” emotional resonance for that idea 
could have been assumed because we had all seen Apocalypse Now and The Deer Hunter, now 
there is very little besides Marvel-type movies that provide such a touchstone within the US. 
Rumsfeld’s Pentagon had to host a special showing of  the Battle of  Algiers in 2003 in order 
to create mutuality because so few officers knew of  the film (Kaufman, 2003). That same 
fire hydrant phenomenon has also made it easy to disconnect from non-fictional history; 
students today know far fewer true stories about human history than they know the history 
of  the Marvelverse.  I recently had a student ask me what the Cold War was, because he had 
never heard of  it.  How do we make the link to foreign policy attitudes and behavior when 
touchstones become more rare than they were in Reagan’s era? 
In addition, what is the method of  data collection and what is the method of  inference for 
determining whether, how, and when “fictional inputs affect real-world behavior”?  Given 
that fictional stories can be contradictory (24 versus Unbroken, for example), how would the 
method of  inference cope with such consumption of  inconsistency?  The authors 
themselves note, “any given text’s influence will likely prove slight when measured in 
aggregate terms or when considered in light of  the multitude of  conflicting messages.” 
Checking for factual errors traceable to fiction or collecting public admissions of  influence, 
as the authors do, seem inadequate given all the many stories in any one 21st century 
individual’s head.   
Consider also the body of  scholarship asserting that watching violent media or pornography 
does not lead to violent or sexually assaultive behavior (Phillips, 2017; Castleman, 2016). 
While I myself  think the jury is out, if  after many decades of  research psychologists are not 
sure whether consumption of  these fictional stories leads to the predicted behavior, what 
are the methodological ramifications for the Daniel/Musgrave enterprise?  “Quantifying 
this effect size would be difficult, but scholars should not assume it is null” is true, but does 
not a research programme inspire. All cultural studies share this set of  methodological 
hurdles, and there have been many creative ways of  clearing them devised in the larger FPA 
literature on culture and foreign policy which might be useful to survey. Those wishing to 
build this area of  study will want to attend to these methodological tasks as the first order 
of  business.  
Despite the methodological minefields, the Daniel/Musgrave paper also raises some 
interesting questions about naïve consumption of  fictional stories.  Clearly such stories can 
be manipulated by their creators to purposefully promote a favored foreign policy 
viewpoint, as they note was done in Cole and Singer’s Ghost Fleet.  What’s the good 
policymaker to do, then, in order to become a sophisticated consumer of  immersive fiction, 
capable of  resisting being “transported”?  Or perhaps policymakers should eschew all such 
stories while in office?  (Or should we be training Steve Walt to write screenplays and novels 
instead of  textbooks and articles?)  A related question is whether story creators should be 
held responsible for the cultural effects they cause.  For example, to read that “24’s depiction 
of  effective torture so strongly affected US military interrogators that the officials vainly 
beseeched the show’s producers to demonstrate ineffective torture” is quite chilling. But 
wouldn’t the quest for accountability take us into Fahrenheit 451 territory? 
Many thanks to Daniel and Musgrave for their thought-provoking article. 
 3
HOW POPULAR CULTURE MATTERS? 
Jutta Weldes 
School of  Sociology, Politics and International Studies  
University of  Bristol 
Grounded in the suitably ‘scientific’ disciplines of  cognitive science and psychology 
appreciated by what the authors call “mainstream” IR scholars, “Synthetic Experiences” sets 
out to demonstrate “How Popular Culture Matters for Images of  International Relations”. 
Addressing IR sceptics who assume that “fictional effects will be washed out by the 
pressures of  the real world” (510), Daniel and Musgrave construct an argument on 
“respectable” (positivist, causal, individualist) terms to provide one specific explanation of  
how ‘ideas’ contained within ‘fictional texts’ – i.e., in popular culture – might matter to IR. 
The authors plausibly argue that something called “synthetic [cognitive] experiences” are 
created by fictional encounters (506) and that “narrative [cognitive] transportation” through 
engagement with fiction can thus change individual beliefs and ideas (508). They therefore 
conclude that “a lifetime’s worth of  exposure to synthetic experiences” may lead to a range 
of  causal effects, from “emphasizing (or de-emphasizing) issues” and “changing opinions 
about strategic effectiveness” to “reinforcing misapprehensions” and “helping to produce 
or reproduce identities relevant to action” (510). On their own terms, their narrative is 
succinctly and compellingly constructed.  
While I hope that their story convinces some ‘mainstream’ sceptics that popular culture 
‘matters for’ IR/ir and that “narratives in fiction and popular culture therefore deserve to 
take their place alongside respectable [sic] sources in the field” (503), I doubt it will. I doubt 
it because I do not think popular culture is ignored in IR mainly because mainstream IR 
assumes “that people can readily discern fact from fiction” (504) in their cognitive 
processing of  knowledge claims about world politics. Instead, I think that the mainstream 
of  IR rejects popular culture for two reasons. First, it does so because popular culture is 
considered trivial, its study frivolous and engagement with it is thus seen by definition to 
undermine IR’s status as a serious (scientific) discipline engaged with serious ‘high politics’. 
Second, it is rejected because most work on popular culture and world politics deploys 
critical theoretical approaches – e.g., post-structural, feminist, decolonial, Marxian – that are 
anathema to that same ‘mainstream’. We could test my hypothesis, applying Daniel and 
Musgrave’s model of  IR scholars’ synthetic experiences of  the idea of  popular culture 
research!  
But “Synthetic Experiences” did not convince me, a non-mainstream IR scholar, either. 
More accurately, as someone already persuaded that ‘popular culture matters’, their 
conclusion provided little that is new. That popular culture ‘influences’ beliefs and actions is 
already well established – indeed taken for granted -- in Popular Culture and World Politics 
(PCWP) literature, although that knowledge is grounded in different – mainly critical and 
structural – theoretical assumptions. How popular culture matters is in many cases also quite 
well established: diverse, often discursive, mechanisms and practices – linguistic, visual, aural, 
kinetic, affective, etc. – have been and continue to be explored to great effect. From this 
angle, an argument justifying popular culture from the vantage point of  individual cognition, 
while interesting, is perhaps unnecessary.  
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More worrisome are the constraining effects such an approach might engender. As 
someone who has worked, for decades now, in the increasingly well-established PCWP field, 
I was taken aback to see the question “how popular culture matters”, for images or 
otherwise, reduced – via a de facto, and perhaps unintended, form of  logical positivism’s 
“intertheoretic reduction” (e.g., Friedman 1982) – from questions of  social meanings, 
practices and structures to individual-level cognition and psychology (504). This reductive 
approach bucks the more expansive intellectual PCWP trend: it radically narrows what has 
traditionally been a wide-ranging, theoretically eclectic, trans-disciplinary, and fundamentally 
critical domain of  inquiry. The long-standing question – “how does popular culture relate to 
world politics?” (Weldes and Rowley 2015; Grayson et al. 2009) – with which the PCWP 
community has grappled for decades, has generally been answered, collectively, by widening 
the theoretical, conceptual and empirical scope of  inquiry, by looking for interconnections 
across the resulting protean terrain and, perhaps most importantly, by deploying this 
question to challenge the limited conceptions of  ‘International Relations’ and ‘world politics’ 
from which it initially arose. This exciting intellectual terrain of  possibility risks being erased 
by a reductive approach that insists we can explain ‘how popular culture matters’ by 
reducing the answer to individual cognition.  
Even if  we accept that such cognitive processes are centrally at work, once that has been 
established, we cannot remain there, but must instead return to the more expansive 
questions being asked from more critical theoretical perspectives within PCWP: 
•In understanding how PC matters for ‘images of  IR”, we are back to investigating 
complex relations between the encoding and decoding of  meanings (e.g., Hall 1994), the 
latent meanings embedded in semiotic structures (e.g., Barthes 1967), the contesting 
meanings produced by differently intersectional reading positions (e.g., Ang 1985) and 
through diverse forms of  intertextuality (e.g., Der Derian and Shapiro 1988; Weldes 2003).    
•In understanding how PC matters beyond “images”, we are back to investigating a much 
wider range of  PC texts and practices, beyond both Star Trek and NCIS (509). From tourist 
choreographies (e.g., Reeves 2018), to romantically gifted diamonds (e.g., Weldes and Rowley 
2015, 21-24), to mega-sporting events (e.g., Schimmel 2012), to street harassment (e.g., 
Weldes 2018), a much wider array of  popular cultural practices are intimately entwined in, 
dependent on, and even responsible for contemporary world politics practices and 
processes.   
•In taking PC seriously, we are back to challenging mainstream understandings of  IR/world 
politics. Constructing ‘popular culture’ and ‘IR/world politics’ such that one ‘matters’ to the 
other reifies fundamentally connected, even indistinguishable, social practices. As Daniel and 
Musgrave recognise (509), IR, like other fictions, tells stories (e.g., Kuusisto 2018; Weber 
2010), and world politics too is based on ‘stories’: from the “Peaceful Atom” (e.g., Boyer 
1994) to Jessica Lynch (e.g., Kumar 2004). Conversely, PC is always already part of  world 
politics. PC is a place where deep thinking about world politics occurs (e.g., Shapiro 2016; 
Van Munster and Sylvest 2015); PC texts/artefacts/practices are industrial products of  
global corporations, traded, regulated and consumed internationally (e.g., Heller 2005); PC 
legitimates, challenges and resists world political practices, like torture (e.g., Adams 2016) and 
counter-terrorism (Van Veeren 2009).  
It would be a shame to take a step backwards from all of  this fruitful PCWP work, to re-
reify problematic categories and to retreat from the expansive range of  critical questions 
that PCWP has hitherto opened up.  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POPULAR CULTURE MATTERS 
Kathleen P.J. Brennan 
Department of  Communication and Humanities  
SUNY Polytechnic Institute  
“Worlds ambiguously natural and crafted”  
-Haraway, Cyborg Manifesto 
In “Synthetic Experiences: How Popular Culture Matters for Images of  International 
Relations” Daniel and Musgrave argue that mainstream IR scholars are making a “bad bet” 
by ignoring the role of  popular culture (PC) in IR (503). Daniel and Musgrave combine a 
comprehensive literature review of  the study of  PC in IR with their methodological 
approach based in cognitive science and psychology. In the closing section of  their article 
they test their model of  “synthetic experiences” through an examination of  “the influence 
of  the US novelist Tom Clancy on issues such as US relations with the Soviet Union and 
9/11” (503). In thinking about this article in relation to the literature on Popular Culture and 
World Politics (PCWP) I found many aspects of  the article to be quite intriguing. 
As a scholar of  PCWP I agree with Daniel and Musgrave that IR scholars ignore PC to 
their own detriment. For me, the value of  studying the relationship between popular culture 
and politics lies in revealing that popular culture already is a productive part of  politics 
whether we want to acknowledge it or not. In fact, politics is first and foremost about 
defining what gets to be part of  the public sphere (what is part of  the discussion), and, 
second, about who has the authority or the “capacity” to deal with these “objects” (Shapiro 
2008, 94). Creating and enforcing the boundaries of  what can count as political is the very 
stuff  of  politics. Popular culture texts are assumed to be apolitical in IR today because of  
current disciplinary norms, rather than any inherent aspect of  their nature: “Social reality is 
lived social relations, our most important political construction, a world-changing 
fiction” (Haraway 1991, 149).  Thus, articles like this one from Daniel and Musgrave are 
important because they reveal the inherent absurdity of  IR’s tendency to discount texts or 
creators simply because they are fictional or part of  PC. 
There are many laudable aspects to this article. First, it is a pleasure to see a piece on PC in 
ISQ. As a flagship journal in the discipline, ISQ has a large role to play in setting, and 
hopefully expanding, the remit of  IR as a field of  thought. Second, Daniel and Musgrave 
included a thoughtful literature review of  both work that explicitly examines PC in IR but 
also work that more broadly examines the role of  culture and ideas in IR.  They do so, 
however, within the context of  their argument that IR as a discipline continues to largely 
ignore this work.  Third, I appreciated the way in which the authors explicitly stated that 
they were putting forward one way to study PC in IR rather than “assert[ing] the primacy of  
any ontological or methodological approach” (506). Finally, I believe that the argument they 
put forward, that understanding the role of  popular authors like Tom Clancy helps explain 
the decision making of  key figures in US foreign policy in the last few decades, makes a 
welcome contribution to the PCWP literature. One of  the great strengths of  PCWP as an 
intellectual community is the variety of  approaches and methodologies that it includes, and 
Daniel and Musgrave add to that diversity. 
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There were, however, a few aspects of  the article that I had questions about.  One issue for 
me was the still highly reductionist picture that Daniel and Musgrave painted of  IR as a 
discipline in which who and what we are meant to study is dominated by elite actors and 
questions of  high politics. If  IR is as they describe it, then my main take away message from 
the article is that IR is a discipline in which I am not interested in participating as a scholar 
of  politics. This can be seen most clearly in their case study in which they focus on 
traditional IR actors (US presidents, the US Congress, and a few core media outlets), and 
incidences of  high level foreign policy and war. I think that this form of  reductionism can 
also be seen in their insistence that IR should focus on the most “popular” of  PC (509), 
which re-imposes a hierarchy that they otherwise claim to challenge.  While the circulation 
of  a particular PC text is one way to show that it should have influence and is thus a valid 
reason to look for that influence, as a criterion it also introduces a selection bias in terms of  
the cases you choose to examine. To some extent, picking the lowest hanging fruit in this 
manner—examining only the most popular of  PC as potential influencers in IR—also 
opens up the scholarship into PC in IR to the critique of  only studying what we already 
know to be important. 
I am also concerned by the extent to which Daniel and Musgrave rely on the notion that IR 
as a field has not taken up the study of  PC more completely because IR scholars believe, 
naively, that trivial PC texts are not worthy of  study. That popular culture is an important 
part of  politics already appears to be a common sense, widely accepted idea. When Daniel 
and Musgrave put forward the notion that IR scholars should lobby to act as advisors to PC 
productions like scientists have in the past (512), I was surprised that they did not 
acknowledge the active, and well known, role of  the US Department of  Defense in US-
based productions. Both internal coverage from sources like the Armed Forces Press Service and 
external mainstream media sources like The Guardian have for years covered the role of  
military liaisons in the production of  Hollywood blockbusters like The Transformers series 
(Smith 2006; Rose 2009). A recent piece in The Independent included an in-depth study of  the 
relationship between the US government and Hollywood, which revealed that “between 
1911 and 2017, more than 800 feature films received support from the US Government’s 
Department of  Defence…On television, [they] found over 1,100 titles received Pentagon 
backing—900 of  them since 2005” (Alford 2017). Thus, I find it hard to believe that any IR 
scholars are actually naïve to the potential influence of  popular culture texts in politics, and 
instead I think that IR scholars see and experience more prestige in studying other aspects 
of  world politics. It is that sensation of  prestige and hierarchy that I believe Daniel and 
Musgrave end up supporting rather than dismantling in their choice of  case study. 
I also worry about the praise that Daniel and Musgrave put forward for Cole and Singer’s 
novel, Ghost Fleet (512-513). If  we are to believe that elite actors naively consume and are 
shaped by popular culture, then my response would not be that this is a magic button we 
should press with impunity. Rather, in line with Daniel and Musgrave’s discussion of  the 
“transporting” effects of  fictional narrative form I take it as a cautionary tale, a further 
proof  of  the power of  such narratives. In examining the nuances of  the power of  narrative 
and the use of  narrative as a way to do IR, I would also look to work published in the Journal 
of  Narrative Politics which “is an interdisciplinary journal rooted in the study of  global politics 
that explores narrative methods in research, writing, and pedagogy.” This particular journal 
was first published in 2014, and had its launch event at the 2014 ISA Annual Convention in 
Toronto. 
The other issue I had, as I alluded to earlier, is their decision to focus on a very popular, 
best-selling author, who was already widely known to be particularly in vogue amongst 
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conservatives who were in power in the US during the time of  their two key examples. As 
they noted, Clancy has been repeatedly “cited on the floor of  Congress” and was called to 
comment on the 9/11 attacks almost immediately (511). Daniel and Musgrave use this 
popularity as one of  their primary reasons for choosing this case to demonstrate the validity 
of  their model, but the very conspicuousness of  their case study makes their conclusions 
less compelling for me. Why do we need to study PC in IR if  we are only reconfirming 
what we already know? I would be particularly interested to read their future work in this 
area if  they are able to apply their model of  synthetic experiences to cases in which the 
influence or power of  a particular PC text or creator is less well documented. 
In conclusion, I am excited to see work on PC in IR in International Studies Quarterly. I hope 
that other readers take this well-written article by Daniel and Musgrave as a great addition to 
the large, diverse, and growing area of  scholarship on PCWP within IR and other related 
fields of  thought.  
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HOW DISTINCTIVE ARE “NARRATIVE 
FICTIONS”? 
David Sylvan 
Graduate Institute of  International and Development Studies 
The use of  composed works of  popular culture to account for “real actors’ behavior” is 
long-standing in accounts of  international relations. Thucydides uses just-so stories about 
etymology and Homeric epic as historical facts; E.H. Carr cites Dosteoevsky’s novels and 
George Bernard Shaw’s plays as evidence of  how individuals and states behave (1941: 64, 
99). In this sense, Daniel and Musgrave are plowing a well-tilled field. 
That said, their work raises a series of  issues. First, they claim that a fictional narrative can 
“engross a reader in its world” and thus that “influential fictions” are “taken as ‘real’” by 
elites who will, at least initially, “evaluate” and “respond to” unexpected events as if  those 
events “resembled” events in fictional narratives. To support these propositions, Daniel and 
Musgrave discuss how political elites in the United States cited Tom Clancy’s novels as 
explaining certain “real-world” events or as supporting their policy proposals.  
But what does it mean to be engrossed in a fictional world (does one have to spend a lot of  
time reading or rereading the books? does one have to talk to others, or dream about, or 
obsess about, those books?), or, in a noncircular way, for a fictional world to be “influential” 
or taken as real (does one expect to see characters in the world? or to find newspaper articles 
reporting the events in the world)? The extensive literature on video gaming, for example, 
suggests that spending many hours playing these games almost never translates into gamers 
thinking that mundane reality is reflective of  the gaming world (Salen and Zimmerman 
2003), nor even – although the evidence on this is more mixed – that gamers’ violent 
behavior in the latter carries over into the former (Zendle, Kudenko, and Cairns 2018). 
Although political elites need not compartmentalize as well as video gamers (see former 
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia’s references to 24’s Jack Bauer), these points do 
indicate a lack of  clarity in Daniel and Musgraves’s mechanism and hypotheses. Their 
methodology could also be strengthened considerably. The fact that various U.S. elites cited 
Clancy’s works does not mean that “audiences changed their beliefs because they read 
Clancy”; rather, those who read Clancy may have come to his works because they already 
held those beliefs. This selection bias is a serious design problem, one not obviated by 
references to “process tracing.” 
A second point is conceptual. Daniel and Musgrave’s argument is about a particular aspect 
of  “popular culture,” namely “fictional narratives.” Although undefined, these appear to be 
comprised of  novels, feature films, and television series. Products of  these genres are treated 
as telling vivid stories; this is why “narrative” is used and why readers and audiences are 
argued to be engrossed in those stories. “Fiction,” though, is counterposed to “real-world 
events”: the narratives are inventions (about persons, events, places...) which never occurred 
in the “real world.”  
Numerous questions can be asked about this way of  framing the argument. First, what is 
the relation between narrative and engrossment? Do certain vivid adventure plots 
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particularly engross certain categories of  political elites, and if  so, why (is it a matter of  
affective power? of  being swept along in a narrative arc)? Are there not numerous elites 
engrossed by romantic plots, by comedies, or by particular scenes (the eyes of  Dr. T.J. 
Eckleburg; the wedding cake in Great Expectations) or even lines of  dialogue (“Frankly my 
dear, I don’t give a damn”; “If  you prick us, do we not bleed?”), and are there not other 
elites bored to tears or turned off  by stories about James Bond or Jack Ryan? Second, how 
salient is the difference between consciously constructed fiction and the contouring of  the 
real world (cf. Burke 1969: 32-35; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 1.1.7; Barthes 
1957)? Aren’t narrative fictions themselves readings of  the “real world,” every bit as much as 
historical, descriptive, or theoretical claims? One would be hard-pressed to see the 
predictable orations by which U.S. presidents announce and justify armed conflicts as more 
accurate accounts of  the situation than “narrative fictions” such as All Quiet on the Western 
Front or Apocalypse Now. 
Lastly, consider “popular culture.” Daniel and Musgrave treat this mostly as narrative 
fictions. But popular culture is far broader, including genres from music to fashion.  There is 
an extensive literature (e.g., Nye 1990; Davenport 2009) on how many of  these forms 
affected international relations. Beyond that, popular culture stretches well beyond 
professionally composed or performed works, covering everything from rites of  passage 
(debutante balls, weddings) to courtesies and forms of  address. On these latter: the 
international relations of  republican Rome were built around domestic cultural practices 
such as clientilism and patronage (Badian 1958), 18th and 19th century European 
diplomacy was permeated by aristocratic customs and norms (Otte 2008), and today’s 
international organizations are shot through with numerous elements of  20th century 
bureaucratic culture (Weaver and Nelson 2016). Should one not try to track analogous 
connections between contemporary cultural tropes such as coolness or non-ostentation and 
the various ways in which politicians and diplomats try to behave? 
None of  these points takes away from Daniel and Musgrave’s contribution. Rather, they 
situate it as one point of  entry onto a large, indeed an enormous, field. 
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THE FUNCTION OF FICTION 
Vineet Thakur 
Institute for History 
Leiden University 
“Non-fiction can distort; facts can be realigned. But fiction never lies.”  
-Naipaul (1981, 67) 
In the age of  Fox and Fake News, V.S. Naipaul’s pithy observation rings more true than 
ever. Within this context, Daniel and Musgrave’s intervention may seem counter-intuitive – 
for it is the character of  fact, rather than fiction we ought to be probing. But, considering 
the range of  disciplinary queries IR has limited itself  to, it is an important intervention. By 
taking the specific case of  Tom Clancy’s novels and how they ‘buttress[ed] the ideological 
edifice of  Reagan-Bush era policies’, Daniel and Musgrave take us into the little-explored 
research question of  how fiction influences international politics. However, that fiction 
shapes the world for us and around us is not an unusual claim to make – most other social 
science and humanities disciplines would indeed consider it fairly obvious. The assumed 
novelty of  the authors’ arguments points more towards the pathologies of  IR as a discipline 
– the American positivist version of  it in particular – and this is what I will focus on. 
Words of  fiction are world-making in many ways. Think of  Chinua Achebe (2009) who, as 
a child, hated the ‘guts’ of  Africans. They spoilt the adventures of  his white hero every time 
he encountered them in his school-book stories by Rider Haggard, John Buchan, Joseph 
Conrad, among others. All the while he took ‘sides with the white man against those 
savages’, until it dawned on him that he was one of  those savages. Or, consider that mildly-
intoxicated African-American person who, after watching ‘Black Panther’ – the first ever 
Hollywood black superhero film – proclaimed: ‘Ah, this must be how white people feel like, 
every day!’ (Coates 2018)  
Superheroes may be fictional characters, but the mass audiences’ ‘synthetic experience’ of  
these caped crusaders goes beyond Daniel and Musgrave’s argument that they change or 
reinforce beliefs; they also constitute individual and social identities. For instance, any effort 
to understand Rudyard Kipling’s ‘white man’s burden’ by process tracing its reception in 
Roosevelt’s administration would fall short of  assessing its real world-making function: that 
of  constituting ‘whitehood’. Fiction makes people and their ideas of  personhood – or, in 
the case of  western fictions about colonial subjects, the lack thereof.  
The turn to fiction is welcome for another reason, too: it opens the space for greater 
engagement with the non-western world. In violent (post)colonial contexts, fiction has 
provided the greatest scope for subversion. By escaping the compulsion to narrate facts, 
fiction writers have repeatedly chased the ‘truth’ in (post)colonial situations. Fiction has 
allowed such writers greater leeway to subvert state and sovereignty (only comparatively so, 
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of  course – there is a long list of  fiction writers jailed, exiled or killed for their work). 
Fictional detours have regularly fingered the constructed nature – if  not outright fictionality 
– of  the State (that we in IR take for granted), in a manner that academic writings in the 
Global South rarely have. By revealing the absurdity of  the (post)colonial state, focusing on 
sensibilities ‘of  touch, sight, hearing and smell’ rather than abstract data, fiction ‘captures the 
drama of  the colonial and the anticolonial’ (Thiong’o 2012: 47). As the Kenyan author 
Ngugi wa Thiong’o argues, it was ‘fiction [that] first gave us a theory of  the colonial 
situation’ (p. 48).  
The social function of  fiction therefore is multi-layered. Fictions purport to create 
‘sympolitical’ individuals, to use Beneditto Croce’s term – those who view the world through 
the lens of  politics, not unpolitical ones. Hence to assume that fictions only transport 
individuals into the story world may not be doing full justice to their operations of  power, 
for they also work to bring back individuals from a state of  alienation into reality. To only 
focus on the belief-suspending notion of  fictions is to rob them of  their ‘history’-making 
character and strip them of  their essentially political nature.  
Even the State is aware of  the politically charged nature of  fictions and their ability to 
subversively approach reality: otherwise how does one explain the absurdity of  the situation 
where the central character in Ngugi’s novel, Matigari – a revolutionary leader – was issued 
an arrest warrant by the Kenyan police! The archives of  state brutality as well as anticolonial 
struggles are more wholly captured in works deemed fiction.  
Finally, fiction also turns the gaze on the inhibitive rituals of  academic labour. The 
producer-labour relationship of  the knowledge economy of  IR has ensured that non-
western authors are only the native informers in the world of  theory. How many non-
western authors, who have studied in their home countries, have published in premier IR 
academic journals? Even an impressionistic eye would reveal to us that fiction writers have 
represented the non-west far better and more numerously than academic ones. When the 
tools of  academic thinking are tied to resources and procedures naturally advantageous to 
the West, imagination is the most viable non-western resource. While this may point to the 
unequal world of  academic knowledge production, it may not be so bad after all. As Achebe 
(1988: 149) says: ‘privilege is one of  the great adversaries of  the imagination; it spreads a 
thick layer of  adipose tissue over our sensitivity’. 
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POPULAR CULTURE, SYNTHETIC 
EXPERIENCES, AND DARK MATTER: A 
RESPONSE TO RESPONSES 
J. Furman Daniel, III and Paul Musgrave 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University  
University of  Massachusetts-Amherst 
We thank International Studies Quarterly, the contributors to this symposium, and especially 
Meera Sabaratnam for this opportunity to expand on our article “Synthetic 
Experiences” (Daniel and Musgrave 2017).This response proceeds in three parts: first, we 
clarify our argument; second, we engage with the symposium contributors; and, third, we 
conclude by laying out what our work means for students of  international relations. 
We wrote this article to provide a falsifiable theoretical mechanism about how popular 
culture could change mass and elite understandings of  world politics. We encountered a 
difficulty analogous to that of  theorists of  dark matter in physics. Although “dark matter is 
thought to account for most matter in the universe, “dark” matter is hard to fit into theories 
derived observations of  the world around us because it is difficult to detect with 
conventional instrumentation. This undetectability does not make it irrelevant: if  dark 
matter did not exist, “calculations show that many galaxies would fly apart instead of  
rotating,” among other points. Understandably, many physicists long resisted the notion that 
matter we cannot see, feel, or detect plays a major role in the universe.  
To apply the analogy to international relations: international-relations scholarship seems to 
have focused its observations, and consequently theorizing, about how knowledge and 
belief  affects images of  world politics (and thus action in world politics) on the “light matter” 
of  prestigious or credentialed sources of  knowledge--everything from off-the-record 
briefings at Chatham House to investigative journalism at Caixin to chatter on CNN and 
graduate seminars at Columbia University. These are easy to see, measure, and record, and 
audiences admit that their ideas stem from such respectable sources. Indeed, as Drezner 
(2017) has catalogued, there are fairly identifiable “industrial” sectors producing arguments 
that fit within this rubric.  
Academics, whose work neatly fits within this vetted ecosystem, naturally incline toward 
theorizing that the contents of  this observable category explain the bulk of  what really 
matters for politics. This focus on vetted sources blinds scholars to the fact that even the 
most elite audiences have finite attention spans and ability to consume “properly” vetted 
knowledge. The “dark matter”, then, would be everything else--the disreputable, unnoticed, 
embarrassing, or stigmatized knowledge that nevertheless affects how people see their place 
in their world (Barkun 2013, 2016)—including, of  course, popular culture, along with 
conspiracy theories, popular histories, and anything else that is difficult for academics to 
detect. The potentially profound influences of  such texts would pass undetected by the 
academic fitted with a worldview and equipment that assumed non-serious sources could 
not have any relevance for the serious business of  world politics.  
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As we continued our research, we discovered that we were far from the only people to have 
guessed that popular culture might prove important for international relations. A broad 
literature had already grappled with the role of  popular culture in politics. This literature did, 
however, seem to us not to answer what we saw as the most pressing question about the 
relationship between “facts” and “fictions,” between audience and texts: why could fiction 
influence the real world? It might be meaningful to talk about Star Trek and Cold War 
liberalism, but how much did it do, under what circumstances, and who was most affected? 
Moreover, why wouldn’t fictional presentations “stay in their lane”? Shouldn’t serious, 
factual, and credentialed information about the world--like, say, our course lectures--guide 
audiences’ beliefs about the world rather than the frippery of  popular culture? Why should 
we think that the effect of  a Star Trek episode wouldn’t be reversed by a Walter Cronkite 
broadcast about the U.S. quagmire in Vietnam?  
Our answer, the notion of  “synthetic experiences,” resulted from our attempt to theorize 
and measure the influence of  this “dark matter”—to find theories that would explain those 
anomalies and predict observable implications that other theories would leave unexplained. 
In doing so, we hoped to bridge the gulf  between different intellectual communities, not 
widen it, by showing that even “elite” audiences performing core features of  statehood and 
security dialogues were affected by these dynamics, as the popular-culture literature had long 
suggested. We wanted to give the mainstream--even researchers like realists and security 
scholars, who might be resistant to these claims—a shove toward the serious study of  
popular culture. And we hoped to show that studying popular culture did not require 
methodologies unfamiliar to the mainstream--that there were theoretical and 
methodological connections that could be made without changing the object of  study.  
That’s why our article presents a hard case, not to persuade the popular-culture studies 
crowd, but rather to convince what we imagine as being the most skeptical group of  IR 
scholars: realists, foreign-policy process experts, and security-studies students. We thus aim 
to show that we can demonstrate evidence consistent with our mechanism’s operation even 
where the elements for popular culture’s influence should be--by these skeptics’ lights--least 
likely to be found: at the highest levels of  government and the media on the core issues of  
state survival and security. Falsifying that null hypothesis would not only provide a boost to 
the credibility of  our claims but also to the broader community of  popular-culture studies. 
Responses to the Symposium 
We are convinced that we succeeded pretty well in our goals. Still, no article is perfectly 
persuasive. Of course, our attempt can, and should, be critiqued and refined. (Purists can 
and should criticize our leap from dual-process models to transportation theory, for 
instance.) Beyond that form of  engagement, however, we have found that the reaction of  
different scholars (in this symposium and elsewhere) to our argument maps relatively cleanly 
onto the preexisting divisions toward the study of  popular culture and world politics. A fair 
proportion of  scholars who have been doing popular-culture work--some, for a long time--
appear skeptical, even hostile, to our work at least partly because they think we are claiming 
novelty where we claim none. On the other hand, many scholars who do more 
“mainstream” work find our article interesting but do not engage with the larger literature 
on popular culture. The responses to our article in this symposium range from Weldes’ 
position that our work is unoriginal and perhaps even harmful, to Hudson’s constructive 
skepticism about how to construct a research project that would test our claims more 
generally. We are grateful for the chance to engage with these critics. 
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Thakur argues that the need for our article shows the pathologies of  positivist American IR, 
given that “most other social science and humanities disciplines would consider [our claim] 
fairly obvious.” We think there may be something to this, but Thakur’s critique also confuses 
our broad goal--of  helping IR and political science take popular culture seriously--with our 
specific theory. Even if  political science was well on the way to taking popular culture as 
seriously as Thakur thinks other disciplines already do (and we would disagree, especially 
given the hegemony of  economics within social science), there would still be room for 
exploring mechanisms and setting bounds on the potential impact of  popular culture. 
We concur emphatically, however, with Thakur’s call to use our article as a springboard to 
investigating the influence of  narratives in--and, we would add, on--the Global South. We 
think our work provides additional ways to investigate the relationship between fiction and 
politics in different societies. Thakur’s critique would again benefit from separating our 
mechanism from the panoply of  mechanisms through which fiction operates on readers. 
One can appreciate narrative transportation without claiming this mechanism “strip[s] 
[stories] of  their essentially political nature.” Thakur’s description of  specific plot points 
would similarly benefit by taking on board not just our theories but others: was Matigari 
important to the Kenyan government because it provided a new symbol or because the 
transporting effect of  the narrative changed minds?  
Sylvan’s critique raises important points regarding future applications of  political science 
meta-theory. Some, such as what it means to be engrossed in a fictional world, are explored 
in depth in the original article and the voluminous specialist literature we reference. We 
appreciate, and concur with, his suggestion that our approach should be incorporated into a 
broader discussion of  how popular culture shapes norms and actions across a wide range 
of  times, places, and agents. By providing a testable set of  hypotheses about how these 
fictions can shape action, we encourage Sylvan and others to adapt our methodology to 
expand upon the broader field.  
We thank Brennan for welcoming us into the popular culture and world politics community. 
But we differ on a few points. First, we do not “praise” Ghost Fleet, but merely describe its 
reception and suggest it may play a role analogous to that of  earlier “next-war” novels like 
The Battle of  Dorking. Second, Brennan appears to believe that we subscribe to a “highly 
reductionist picture” of  international relations, even though our theorizing repeatedly refers 
to mass audiences; there is no reason the theory could not be applied to understand the 
dynamics of  participants in world politics far removed from the Oval Office or Number 10. 
Third, journalistic accounts about the role of  the Defense Department in movie production 
does establish that someone thinks that popular culture matters (and we have recommended 
many of  the same articles to others), but it does not establish that “most” or “mainstream” 
IR scholars know about this involvement or--more critically--think it affects the actual 
practice of  world politics. It is also premature to think that popular culture’s importance is 
commonsensical for most international-relations theorists. 
Weldes appears to believe we dismiss the importance of  other works in the field or that we 
aim to shut down other avenues by which these subjects can be investigated. That claim 
contradicts the spirit and text of  our article, as we describe above. A more fruitful discussion 
about bringing together different forms of  inquiry would proceed from questions like how 
our mechanism, and other more precise claims, could aid scholars who have long toiled in 
these fields or how our findings about texts’ influence on elites could be combined with 
other arguments for clarifying the field’s importance to scholars who are dismissive of  them. 
We look forward to future chances to make these connections. 
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We thank Hudson for appreciating our appreciating the “professional cover” we provide 
future scholars to engage in PCWP and foreign policy analysis. We agree with her 
observation that the kaleidoscopic nature of  media complicates the simplistic transmission 
models used by previous generations of  scholars, producers, and consumers—there is 
unlikely to be another Tom Clancy (although, as she notes, corporate properties like the 
Marvel Cinematic Universe may form new focal points).  
We think, however, that the development of  a more varied media ecosystem opens more 
doors than it closes. In observational studies, the burgeoning number of  fictional 
presentations (a product of  “Peak TV”, YouTube, and the Internet) should make it easier to 
identify variations in transportation by audience. A media ecosystem that allows The 
Americans, NCIS, and Homeland to find audiences lets us say more about who believes what 
in fiction than the three-network (U.S.) ecosystem of  the 1960s. 
Hudson raises an important question about an implication of  our work (and the broader 
universe of  claims that popular culture wields influence in a way that scholarship may not): 
why haven’t Stephen Walt--or Valerie Hudson!--written screenplays instead of  journal 
articles? Or, if  fiction can be so persuasive and misleading, why not ban fiction? The latter is, 
of  course, historically widespread: authoritarian and illiberal governments from Maoist 
China to the Boston city government have banned subversive, or “unwholesome,” fictions 
precisely because of  fears of  political unrest or cultural change. We do not approve of  these 
efforts but we do take them as the tribute of  vice to our theory’s virtues. As to the former 
question, we do think (as Brennan notes) that efforts through venues like “Bridging the 
Gap” should include connecting scholars to Hollywood as well as to Capitol Hill. 
Conclusion 
Where do we go from here? Hudson’s comment that our modest descriptions of  our 
findings “does not a research programme inspire” is well-taken, as is her point (echoed by 
Brennan, Thakur, and Weldes) that many other scholars have already found ways to conduct 
ambitious research enterprises. We think that the synthetic-experiences project can 
contribute to international-relations and other enterprises in two ways. 
The first could come from extending and refining the synthetic experiences mechanism, 
given its foundations in the psychological and other literatures. Does a fictional narrative 
that invokes overtly political themes activate mechanisms different from those activated by 
non-political narratives? Do audiences high in political knowledge find different kinds of  
narratives transporting than those low in political knowledge? Are synthetic experiences 
cosmopolitan, able to be evoked in narratives about political environments otherwise 
unfamiliar to audiences, or are they so parochial that Americans really only find American-
style politics (as Saudi Arabians find Saudi-style politics) convincing? Experimental and 
observational studies could be employed to build out these elements of  the theory. 
The second could come from using synthetic experience theorizing to set bounds on the 
effect sizes of  various synthetic experiences. If  op-ed articles, satirical shows, and 
infotainment programming can persuade large numbers of  people, then perhaps similar 
investigations could establish the persuasive effects of  novels, short stories, television 
episodes, or films (Coppock, Ekins, and Kirby 2018; Young 2013; Baum 2002). The notion 
of  synthetic experiences also suggests that separable elements of  narratives should also 
matter; testing audiences’ reception of  tropes that are purely fictional but familiar with 
unfamiliar but accurate nonfictional sources could establish the degree to which such 
elements circulate (mis)information. The former set would put this research more in 
 16
conversation with political communications and political psychology; the latter with more 
applied and macro fields such as international-relations theory or voter behavior.  
We greatly appreciate the opportunity to discuss and debate our article with a broad range 
of  our colleagues. Although our model is imperfect, we believe that it provides a testable 
framework for demonstrating the impact of  popular culture on foreign policy. Much work 
remains to be done to expand upon this project, but we believe the strength and diversity of  
the comments provided here help improve our arguments as well as expose them to a 
broader audience. We hope the field of  international relations will be richer and more 
precise discipline for these efforts. 
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